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Immigration Law under the 
McLachlin Court 
Catherine Dauvergne* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s years at the helm of the Supreme Court of 
Canada coincided with two important changes in immigration law. The 
first was a shift of immigration matters towards the centre of political 
contestation in Canada, as well as in many other Western liberal 
democracies. The second shift, directly related to the first, was a 
movement towards more detail and specificity in immigration legislation, 
and a concomitant reduction in the discretionary ambit for frontline 
decision-makers. As a result of these two developments, the McLachlin 
Court witnessed an increase in the number of immigration cases that 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada, and a transformation in the type 
of issues that arose within immigration law. 
This paper examines the immigration jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Canada during the McLachlin years, and considers the influence 
that these two shifts had on the way the Court responded to immigration 
law questions. It also considers the role that Chief Justice McLachlin 
herself played in this area of law. Overall, a close look at the realm of 
immigration law confirms the narrative running through many accounts 
of Chief Justice McLachlin’s long and distinguished tenure: she provided 
steady and determined leadership, and led by example and sheer hard 
work. While immigration law is not generally considered a high-profile 
part of her legacy, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a number of highly 
significant decisions in this area, and participated in almost every ruling. 
It is certainly the case that by the end of her term as Chief Justice, 
immigration lawyers and scholars had a very different understanding of 
the role of the Supreme Court than they did when she was appointed to 
the Court in 1989, or even in 2000 when she became Chief Justice.  
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This analysis proceeds by first describing the political backdrop to 
immigration law during the McLachlin Court’s tenure. It then assesses the 
Court’s work in this area; and finally, concludes by reflecting on Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s legacy in Canadian immigration law.  
1. Immigration Law in the Early 21st Century  
From the vantage point of 2018, it is difficult to imagine the legal and 
political backdrop for immigration law in the 1980s which was 
characterized by broad swathes of discretion and bipartisan approaches at 
the national level in Canada. The idea of a global asylum crisis was 
barely on the horizon. In 1987, American scholar Stephen Legomsky 
published his seminal work Immigration and the Judiciary in which he 
demonstrated that immigration was a realm of strong executive power 
with very high levels of discretion, attracting a unique form of deference 
from the courts.1 His analysis drew from empirical work in Britain and the 
United States, but the trend was notable throughout the common law world.2 
By the 1990s, however, change was on the horizon. A sharp spike 
upwards in the number of people seeking asylum around the globe 
throughout the 1980s (which pales in comparison with the present) brought 
with it the beginning of a new politics of immigration in Canada, and 
across similarly situated Western liberal democracies. This new politics in 
turn brought new legal developments. Final level appellate courts had a 
key role to play in reshaping the terrain. The landmarks in Canada include 
the Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration3 decision of 1985, 
the first Charter4 ruling on non-citizen rights. This hastened the 
introduction of Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board in 1989, the 
nation’s largest administrative tribunal which now occupies much of  
the terrain of immigration law in this country. Shortly after, in 1992, the 
judicial review jurisdiction of the Federal Court and Federal Court of 
Appeal (as they are now known) were sharply reduced in immigration 
matters.5 These changes provide immigration decisions with a thick layer 
                                                                                                                       
1  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and 
America (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 
2  See Catherine Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws of 
Australia and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
3  [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R 177 (S.C.C.). 
4  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5  In order for an immigration judicial review to be heard by the Federal Court, that court 
must first grant leave, which it has done over the past decade for approximately 15 per cent of 
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of insulation from constitutional review; they also ensure that the Federal 
Court has not become a de facto immigration court, which it otherwise 
would be.6 More has been done in Canada than in any other Western 
liberal “settler state” to limit the role of courts in immigration matters. 
Despite this, the McLachlin Court made more, and more significant, 
decisions in the area of immigration than any of its predecessors.  
In the mid-1990s, the government began accepting more immigrants 
in the “economic” category than in the “family” category for the first 
time (a move which the Trump administration in the United States was 
promoting as an option in 2018), and in 2002, new comprehensive 
immigration legislation was introduced in Canada, providing an overhaul 
of immigrant, refugee, and temporary admissions for the first time since 
the 1970s.7 At the outset, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(“IRPA”) was touted as “framework” legislation, meaning that it provided 
a structure and key principles, while ensuring flexibility by anticipating 
that many of the law’s details would emerge through subsequent 
regulatory or even policy development. In other words, the law was built 
to accommodate political change. The new legislation enumerated 27 
separate “objectives”, ensuring that whatever actions were taken, they 
would be in keeping with the aims of the law.8  
In 2005, when the first case interpreting the IRPA reached the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin penned the Court’s 
                                                                                                                       
judicial review applications. For the resulting judicial review decision to be appealed, the first 
instance judge must “certify” a question for the Federal Court of Appeal to consider. These two very 
significant hurdles are added to the usual barriers of time and expense, as well as the leave procedure of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, to sharply reduce the immigration law matters that reach the highest 
court. A series of developments from the late 1970s to the early 1990s created this regime, culminating 
in the Act to amend the Immigration Act and other Acts in consequence thereof (S.C. 1992, c. 49, 
amending R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2) which transferred judicial review authority over all decisions taken under 
the Immigration Act to single judges of the Federal Court, Trial Division, and access to appeal from a 
Trial Division judicial review decision was subject to a requirement that the Trial Division judge certify 
that the case involve a serious question of general importance. 
6  The website of the Federal Court indicates that between January 1 and December 31, 
2017, the most recent period for which statistics are available, of 6,766 decided applications for 
leave and judicial review in the area of immigration, 1,195, or 17.66 per cent, were granted leave, 
which means that more than 80 per cent never made their way to court (see Federal Court of Canada, 
Statistics Activity Summary — January 1 to December 31, 2017 (Ottawa: Federal Court, 2017), 
online: <http://cas-cdc-www02.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Statistics/statistics-dec17>).  
A study by Sean Rehaag provided similar data, demonstrating that between 2005 and 2010, 14.44 per 
cent of applications for leave and judicial review of refugee matters were granted leave (see Sean 
Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1 Queen’s 
L.J. 1, at 51). 
7  See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. 
8  Id., s. 3. 
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unanimous ruling. She summarized the purpose of the new legislation 
as follows: 
The objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an intent to prioritize 
security. This objective is given effect by preventing the entry of 
applicants with criminal records, by removing applicants with such 
records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligation of permanent 
residents to behave lawfully while in Canada. This marks a change 
from the focus in the predecessor statute, which emphasized the 
successful integration of applicants more than security ...9  
Despite the 27 discrete objectives contained in the legislation, there is 
no doubt that the Chief Justice accurately captured the law’s animating 
force. While much of the consultation and drafting took place prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the security politics ushered in 
by that moment provided the final momentum to ensure smooth passage 
for the bill.  
The transformation of Canadian immigration law began rather than 
ended with the IRPA. In 2004, influenced by the inception of the 
Homeland Security agency in the United States, Canada’s Martin 
government created the Canadian Border Services Agency, and explicitly 
transferred responsibilities for some immigration matters to a security 
agency for the first time. That same year, the Canada-U.S. Safe Third 
Country Agreement10 transformed Canadian refugee law by intertwining 
some aspects of it with American law for the first time in history. In 
2006, Stephen Harper’s Conservative government came to power, 
ushering in a decade of ongoing legislative change in immigration, 
refugee, and citizenship law. The Harper decade marked an 
unprecedented pace of change. The Conservative immigration agenda 
included the Balanced Refugee Reform Act,11 the Faster Removal of 
Foreign Criminals Act,12 the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural 
                                                                                                                       
9  Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 31, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, at para. 10 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Medovarski”]. The question in Medovarski was how to interpret transitional 
provisions of the new Act. In light of the Chief Justice’s statement regarding the purpose of the Act, 
the conclusion that the type of “stay” that would justify withholding deportation ought to be narrowly 
interpreted was easy to reach. 
10  Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States 
of America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third 
countries, December 5, 2002, CTS 2004/2 (entered into force December 29, 2004). 
11  S.C. 2010, c. 8. 
12  S.C. 2013, c. 16. 
 IMMIGRATION LAW UNDER THE MCLACHLIN COURT 121 
 
Practices Act,13 and the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act,14 to list 
a few of the more flamboyant titles. The end result was an immigration 
law framework that many ordinary Canadians find hard to believe, so far 
is it from our much-cherished immigration mythology. The current 
Trudeau government is reworking some of these changes, but thus far its 
reform focus has been on highly symbolic aspects of the legal regime 
that affect comparatively few people. Large system changes such as a 
complete reform of economic category admissions, much stricter 
removal (read: deportation) rules in cases of criminal conduct, a new 
system for refugee status determination, and striking new limits on 
second generation citizenship, have not been altered. As of mid-2018, 
there is no suggestion that these far-reaching provisions of the Harper 
decade will be changed.15  
With new legislation being passed on a regular basis since the turn of 
the 21st century, and with much of it aimed at the type of security and 
criminality objectives that run close to the limits of human rights 
protections, it is hardly surprising that more cases ended up on the 
Supreme Court of Canada docket during these years. Furthermore, the 
large ambit of discretionary administrative decision-making that was 
described by Legomsky has been progressively curtailed by this 
legislative onslaught. A good example of this is the provision allowing 
for humanitarian and compassionate exceptions to the law. In the 70s, 
80s, and 90s, this provision was a one liner. Today it consists of three 
pages of text in the Act,16 and is accompanied by regulations and policy 
guidance. These humanitarian and compassionate provisions alone were 
amended in 2010, 2012, and 2013 (not counting changes to the 
supporting regulations). With each legislative addition of precision, there 
is less discretion for frontline decision-makers, and therefore more ways 
in which they can go wrong. With so much more law on the books  
(by simple measure of volume), there is much more that is open to 
challenge. Furthermore, with increasing political focus on immigration, 
                                                                                                                       
13  S.C. 2015, c. 29. 
14  S.C. 2014, c. 22. 
15  Interestingly, it has recently been announced that the Trudeau government intends to 
remove one category of health inadmissibility from the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (see 
e.g., Kathleen Harris, “Ottawa to Present Plan to Amend Policy that Rejects Immigrants on Medical 
Grounds by April, Hussen Says” CBC (15 February 2018), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
politics/immigration-hussen-medical-inadmissibility-1.4537076)>. This provision is long-standing in 
Canadian immigration law, and was not significantly altered by the Harper government. It is a 
provision which is often subject to successful requests for exceptions on humanitarian grounds. 
16  IRPA, supra, note 7, s. 25. 
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the question of whether an immigration case raises an issue of national 
importance, such that the Supreme Court might be tempted to grant leave 
for an appeal, is more likely to be answered in the affirmative.  
These shifts in the Canadian immigration landscape find parallels 
across the Western liberal democratic landscape.17 The hardening of 
borders, the emergence of immigration as a central issue in electoral 
politics, the increasing vilification of migrants, and an unprecedented 
number of people seeking refuge have now become familiar to us. Juliet 
Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in 2006 to describe the 
increasing criminalization of immigrants and immigration.18 As clunky as 
the word sounds, its intuitive logic is undeniable.  
All of these developments form the backdrop to the McLachlin 
Court’s encounter with immigration law.  
2. The Rulings of the McLachlin Court  
In the 18 years that The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin 
served as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down 22 
immigration law decisions. I have taken a broad approach to this count, 
by including all cases that arose under either the earlier Immigration 
Act,19 or the IRPA, as well as all the Citizenship Act20 cases.  
This approach overstates the label “immigration law” in two ways. The 
first is by counting cases that interpret only the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention,21 which arise because the Convention is implemented into 
Canadian law by including some of its provisions within the immigration 
legislation. The second over-inclusion results from the addition of 
citizenship cases that deal with the transition between immigration law 
and citizenship law that occurs when a person naturalizes. These cases 
are not truly “immigration law”, but share a thematic terrain, and often 
citizenship law and immigration law are responsive to similar political 
                                                                                                                       
17  I explore this maelstrom in The New Politics of Immigration (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
18  Juliet Stumpf, “The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants Crime and Sovereign Power” 
(2006) 56:2 A.U.L. Rev. 367. 
19  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2. 
20  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29. 
21  1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, as 
amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, January 21, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
[hereinafter “Refugee Convention”]. 
 IMMIGRATION LAW UNDER THE MCLACHLIN COURT 123 
 
pressures.22 I have excluded extradition cases from this dataset despite 
the fact that extradition also deals with movement across borders, 
because those cases only rarely touch on questions of immigration and 
nationality, and because they do not fit within the trend towards 
heightened political contestation and a reduction of discretion. The 
resulting group of cases is somewhat smaller than what would be 
included by a focus on the rights of non-citizens, and thus gives a clearer 
picture of a particular area of the law.23 By comparison to this group of 22, 
in the preceding 11 years, when Justice McLachlin was a puisne judge on 
the Court, 11 decisions in this category were handed down.  
One of the most notable distinctions between these two groups of 
decisions is that Chief Justice McLachlin took a more active role in 
immigration law matters once becoming the Court’s leader. Of the  
11 rulings between 1989 and 1999, she was on the panel in eight 
rulings, and did not write any opinions. Once becoming Chief Justice, 
she was on the panel in 21 of 22 rulings, and penned six unanimous or 
majority opinions, and one dissent.24 Among the rulings she chose to 
write were the first decision under the IRPA, the two leading rulings on 
immigration law’s security certificate procedure (which have attracted 
attention around the world), and a significant ruling reading down 
human smuggling provisions which marked an important shift in the 
progress of “crimmigration”.  
What these rulings have in common, and share with the others penned 
by McLachlin C.J.C., is that they have strong criminal law themes. 
Accordingly, one conclusion may be that as immigration law turned 
                                                                                                                       
22  Further, similar access restrictions apply in the area of citizenship. The Federal Courts 
Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, apply to citizenship and 
immigration, and r. 3 states that “[t]hese Rules apply to the following applications and appeals under the 
Citizenship Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: (a) applications for leave;  
(b) applications for judicial review; and (c) appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal from judgments of the 
Federal Court”. 
23  That is, as opposed to a particular group of people. My 2013 paper “How the Charter has 
Failed Non-Citizens in Canada: Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of Canada Jurisprudence” 
(2013) 58:3 McGill L.J. 703, takes this broader question as its starting point, and as a result looks at a 
larger group of cases: 24 in total between 1982 and 2012. 
24  See R. v. Appulonappa, [2015] S.C.J. No. 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Appulonappa”]; B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] S.C.J. No. 58, [2015] 3 
S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B010”]; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33 (S.C.C.); Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 68, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Febles”]; Charkaoui v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Charkaoui (No. 1)”]; Medovarski, supra, note 9; Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 769 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lavoie”]. 
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more significantly towards criminalization, it moved more directly into 
an area where Chief Justice McLachlin has had an authoritative voice.  
I am not persuaded, however, that this is the sole variable at work. Given 
that this distinction emerged only after she became Chief Justice, and 
that she sat on cases with criminal themes during her time as a puisne 
judge, I think this set of decisions reflects a conscious embrace of 
leadership, possibly because of the increasing importance of immigration 
questions to the national polity during this time period. This conclusion 
is bolstered by the fact that as Chief Justice she chose to sit on almost 
every immigration panel.  
Twenty-two is a very small number of cases in comparison with many 
other legal subjects the McLachlin Court addressed. Given the atypical 
journey an immigration case has in reaching the Supreme Court because 
of the Canadian government’s steadfast efforts to limit access to the 
courts, every single one of these cases is important. Looking briefly at 
each of these rulings gives a good sense of what has been important in 
immigration law over the past three decades. 
The cluster of cases from the 1990s when McLachlin J. was a puisne 
justice (there were none in 1989) is a good starting point. Of the 11 
decisions from that decade, three deal with interpretations of the Refugee 
Convention, and thus make contributions to international law.25 These 
rulings are relevant everywhere in the world where the Refugee 
Convention is in force, and are only characterized as immigration rulings 
because of Canada’s mode of incorporating international law. Two other 
judgments interpret Citizenship Act provisions.26 Two more cases focus 
on vital procedural questions that arose in the context of immigration 
law.27 Finally, four cases concern interpretations of Canada’s 
Immigration Act.28 Among the 11 cases, an intersection with criminality 
                                                                                                                       
25  See Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] S.C.J. No. 74, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”]; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pushpanathan”]; Chan v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] S.C.J. No. 78, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 (S.C.C.). 
26  See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] S.C.J. No. 82, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tobiass”]; Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 26, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Benner”]. 
27  See Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 5, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.); Reza v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 49, [1994] 2 
S.C.R. 394 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reza”]. 
28  See Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] S.C.J. No. 27, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chiarelli”]; Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1993] S.C.J. No. 38, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dehghani”]; Chen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] S.C.J. No. 17, 
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is at the heart of one Refugee Convention decision and one of the 
substantive rulings on the Immigration Act. Criminality casts a shadow 
over at least two of the other rulings as well, but in the 1990s, it was not 
the dominant theme. 
In this group of cases we find the most significant refugee law ruling 
to date in Canada — Ward29 — and the case which is arguably the most 
well-know of all Canadian administrative law rulings of the 20th century, 
Baker.30 So, it is not the case that nothing significant was taking place. 
What is remarkable, however, is that neither of these cases was treated by 
the Court as being about criminality in a significant way. Patrick Francis 
Ward had been a member of an Irish paramilitary group, which he later 
fled when its criminal methods became too much for his conscience, and 
he ended up needing protection from the group. In the 21st century this 
case would almost certainly have been about the Refugee Convention’s 
exclusion provisions,31 but in the 1993 judgment, exclusion was scarcely 
noted. Mavis Baker was a migrant whose status in Canada had long since 
lapsed and who was struggling with mental illness. In 1999, the case 
centred on humanitarianism and compassionate considerations, and the 
phrase “illegal immigrant”, which would undoubtedly predominate these 
days, was not even mentioned.32 
Justice McLachlin, as she then was, did not have a strong voice in 
immigration law in her first decade on the Court. She sat on eight of the 
panels, and in each case concurred with a unanimous or majority 
judgment.33 This pattern of involvement makes her firm hand with 
immigration matters as Chief Justice all the more remarkable. 
An examination of the rulings during her years as Chief Justice shows 
marked differences from the 1990s group of decisions. The change 
ushered in by the shifting politics of immigration is discernible even at a 
bird’s-eye-view. Of the 22 decisions, 17 involve interpretations of 
                                                                                                                       
[1995] 1 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chen”]; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
29  Supra, note 25. 
30  Supra, note 28. 
31  See Refugee Convention, supra, note 21, art. 1F. Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
sets out three categories of individuals who are excluded from refugee protection on the basis of 
their criminal (or other reprehensible) acts. 
32  Remarkably, in the 37 pages of the ruling as printed in the Supreme Court Reports, the 
word “illegal” occurs only three times. Twice this is in reference to how Mavis Baker supported 
herself, and once it is a quotation from the ministerial guidelines which refers in full to an “illegal de 
facto resident” as a hypothetical instance (Baker, supra, note 28, at 835 (S.C.R.)). 
33  See Baker, id.; Pushpanathan, supra, note 25; Chen, supra, note 28; Reza, supra, note 27; 
Dehghani, supra, note 28; Chiarelli, supra, note 28; Benner, supra, note 26; Tobiass, supra, note 26. 
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immigration legislation (which over this time frame includes both the 
Immigration Act and the IRPA), only two concern the Refugee 
Convention,34 two consider adjacent procedural matters,35 and only one 
involves the Citizenship Act.36 This picture demonstrates a significantly 
higher degree of engagement with immigration legislation than the cases 
of the preceding 11 years. What is more, across all 22 rulings, the central 
issue is intertwined with criminality in all but six.37 In 16 cases, the 
individual at the heart of the dispute was alleged or had been proven to 
have committed a crime that did not simply involve a breach of some 
aspect of immigration law itself. This group includes the Refugee 
Convention cases, which concern exclusion, and the procedural matters, 
and deal with steps in the conviction process.  
It is in this group of cases that Chief Justice McLachlin demonstrates 
her leadership style. Her role here is characterized by persistence and a 
phenomenal work rate. As Chief Justice, she moved decisively into  
the area of immigration law, which had not previously been her 
bailiwick. Moreover, in a number of key cases, she wrote for the 
majority. The turn towards criminalization within immigration law 
undoubtedly made this transition easier for her, but with other strong 
criminal law voices on the Court, and with several others who had taken 
the lead in previous immigration matters, this outcome was not 
foreseeable. It is revealing to take a closer look at the seven judgments 
she penned, and perhaps to muse a wee bit about these choices. Of the 
seven, four stand out as clear turning points for Canadian immigration 
law.38 But of course, every Supreme Court of Canada ruling is a turning 
                                                                                                                       
34  See Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2013] S.C.J. No. 40, [2013] 2 
S.C.R. 678 (S.C.C.); Febles, supra, note 24. 
35  See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 
S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pham, [2013] S.C.J. No. 100, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739 (S.C.C.). 
36  See Lavoie, supra, note 24. 
37  See Lavoie, id.; Kanthasamy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 909 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] S.C.J. No. 30, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 
504 (S.C.C.); Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 58, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706 (S.C.C.); Law 
Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 (S.C.C.); Chieu v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84 (S.C.C.). The 
Chieu ruling is indirectly tinged with criminality as its companion case Al-Sagban v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) ([2002] S.C.J. No. 2, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 133 (S.C.C.)) did involve an 
immigrant with a criminal conviction in Canada. Mr. Chieu had misrepresented facts in an immigration 
application. 
38  Two of the four cases were heard together (Appulonappa, supra, note 24; B010, supra, 
note 24) but dealt with differing statutory provisions and are each full decisions in their own right, 
not true companion cases. 
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point in some sense. The other three include a follow-up to one of these 
pathbreakers, a notable dissent, and a recent Refugee Convention 
decision that firmly rejects a turning point.  
The first turning point ruling penned by McLachlin C.J.C. is 
Medovarski, mentioned above.39 At first blush, Medovarski scarcely 
looks like turning point material because its sole concern is transitional 
provisions of the IRPA — as such its ruling applies to a strictly limited 
group. The case involved two permanent residents: Olga Medovarski, 
convicted of criminal negligence causing death after a drunk driving 
offence; and Julio Esteban, convicted of conspiracy to traffic cocaine. 
Under the previous legislation, they each would have been able to appeal 
the removal order that resulted from their criminal sentence. Under the 
new legislation, that appeal no longer existed, but Medovarski and 
Esteban had been convicted prior to the new law, and thus were captured 
by transitional provisions. The case reads primarily as a detailed and 
technical statutory interpretation puzzle, but the essence of the ruling is 
straightforward and significant: in looking at the overall ambit of the new 
legislation, and in particular at its stated objectives, McLachlin C.J.C. 
concluded that with the new legislation Parliament intended to prioritize 
security over other immigration objectives such as the integration of 
newcomers.40 This conclusion marks a significant turning point for 
Canadian immigration law, and powerfully reflects the political 
atmosphere of its time. While immigrant advocates had seen the writing 
on the wall, the large number of enumerated objectives for the IRPA had 
left some hope that the new law would not be reduced to a singular 
focus. Chief Justice McLachlin saw incisively through the obfuscation of 
the legislation, and said so directly.  
In contrast to the Medovarski ruling, the second turning point decision 
penned by McLachlin C.J.C. had all the hallmarks of significance. 
Argument in the case now known simply as Charkaoui (No. 1) by 
immigration lawyers was heard over three full days and 18 parties were 
granted intervener status.41 Both of these numbers are exceptional.  
By comparison, the Delgamuukw42 case was argued over two days and 
                                                                                                                       
39  See supra, note 9 and surrounding text. 
40  See Medovarski, id., at para. 10. 
41  Charkaoui (No. 1), supra, note 24. The hearing was held on June 13, 14, and 15 in 2006 
and the ruling handed down on February 23, 2007. 
42  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
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the Secession Reference43 over four; an average case has a half-day 
hearing. Charkaoui (No. 1) was a signal case because it tested the limits 
of the Charter as deployed in the war on terror. Under the IRPA, it is 
permissible to detain non-citizens in anticipation of removing them from 
Canada. A similar provision is used and accepted throughout Western 
liberal democracies. Two complications arise, and formed the challenge 
in this case. The first is that some individuals are unlikely ever to be 
deported, because to do so would almost certainly lead to their torture or 
death.44 As a result, their detention continues, potentially indefinitely. 
The second complication is that under the legislation’s “security 
certificate” procedure, the evidence that forms the basis of this detention 
can be provided in secret to the judge who makes the order. In the 
version of the legislation brought before the Supreme Court, the evidence 
did not need to be shared with the individual concerned or with their 
lawyer. This procedure was used primarily for evidence gathered by 
national security agencies in Canada, or obtained from the agencies of 
allied states.  
The capacity to use immigration law provisions to effect indefinite 
detention of terrorism suspects without airing the evidence publicly or 
testing it against a criminal standard was deployed in a number of 
Western liberal democracies in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States, and consequently tested in pinnacle 
courts.45 In Charkaoui (No. 1), McLachlin C.J.C. wrote for a unanimous 
Court. This is another mark of her leadership on the Court — in matters  
of this heft, she was often successful in fostering consensus. The case 
raised a complex series of Charter arguments, and the ruling is a 
carefully crafted parsing. The Court upheld a number of aspects of the 
security certificate regime, but struck down as discriminatory a process 
rights distinction between foreign nationals and permanent residents, and 
set a requirement that the government devise a system for some limited 
                                                                                                                       
43  Reference re Secession of Québec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Secession Reference”]. 
44  The Supreme Courts’s 2002 ruling in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) does make it possible in narrow 
circumstances for Canada to deport an individual to a prima facie risk of torture, but in practice this 
option has not been used. Chief Justice McLachlin was part of the unanimous Court in Suresh. 
45  Key rulings on the subsequent challenges in English-speaking common law jurisdictions 
include A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and Another v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2005] 5 L.R.C. 34, [2004] UKHL 56 (U.K.H.L) in the U.K.; Zaoui 
v. Attorney-General, [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (N.Z.C.A.) in New Zealand; Al-Kateb v. Godwin, (2004) 
79 ALD 233, [2004] HCA 37 (H.C.A.) in Australia. 
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airing of “secret” evidence. What truly makes the case a turning point for 
immigration law is McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach to interpreting section 7 
of the Charter.46 Previously, section 7 had been applied in immigration 
cases on the basis of understanding “principles of fundamental justice” in 
an immigration context. In the Charkaoui (No. 1) ruling, the Court began 
instead from a “security context”, charting a new direction for basic 
reasoning about the functions and limits of immigration provisions.47  
The final two key rulings penned by Chief Justice McLachlin are a 
closely linked pair of judgments handed down in November 2015: 
Appulonappa and B010.48 These two are not true companion decisions as 
they deal with different sections of the IRPA, and each ruling is fully 
reasoned in its own right. The matters were, however, heard together and 
the rulings were handed down on the same date and cross-reference 
one another. The Appulonappa and B010 cases mark a turning point in 
the progress of criminalizing immigration. They were heard together 
because they both dealt with the question of whether those who assist 
others to enter Canada in breach of immigration laws are engaged in 
“people smuggling” if their actions include feeding or otherwise caring 
for others with whom they are travelling, including their own children. 
The Court writes of assisting “close family members” and “legitimate 
humanitarian aid”.49 In B010, all the individuals had been excluded from 
the refugee determination process on the basis of serious criminality 
because of these actions. In Appulonappa, the case reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada after a criminal prosecution for people smuggling was 
detoured by a constitutional challenge to the wording of the IRPA’s 
smuggling offence. By grouping Appulonappa and B010 together, the 
Supreme Court brought together a criminal prosecution and a regular 
immigration proceeding. From one perspective, bringing immigration 
and criminal cases together in this way is the apex of “crimmigration”. 
But on the other hand, the criminal case introduced a different series of 
procedural considerations than the immigration cases, different Charter 
arguments, and a different type of evidentiary record, which appear to 
have played a role in the conclusions. 
                                                                                                                       
46  Charter, supra, note 4, s. 7. 
47  Supra, note 24, at paras. 23-27. The previously leading case on the interpretation of s. 7 in 
immigration legislation matters was Chiarelli, supra, note 28, a ruling in which McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) was a member of a unanimous panel. 
48  Supra, note 24. 
49  Appulonappa, supra, note 24, at para. 11. 
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Whether or not the Court was directly influenced by these 
distinctions, the resulting rulings were more favourable to the migrants in 
question than almost every other ruling at every level of court where 
criminality and immigration had been intertwined. My speculation is that 
the strong protections for the accused that come with criminal 
prosecution played a role in framing these cases differently for the Court. 
In other words, the progress of “crimmigration” in these cases is so 
advanced that it works to the benefit of migrants. Chief Justice 
McLachlin wrote both decisions. The influence of criminality is clear 
from her opening paragraph in the B010 ruling: 
The smuggling of human beings across international frontiers is a 
matter of increasing concern all over the world. Those who are 
smuggled pay large sums for what are frequently life-threatening 
journeys to countries for which they have no documentation or right of 
entry. Some of these migrants are refugees who have a well-founded 
fear of persecution in their home country and a right to protection under 
Canadian and international law. The smugglers, for their part, cynically 
prey on these people’s desperate search for better lives to enrich 
themselves without heed to the risks their victims face. The smugglers’ 
activities are often controlled by extensive transnational criminal 
organizations which Canada and other states seek to combat through 
multilateral cooperation.50 
Chief Justice McLachlin drew directly on a comparison with the 
criminal law in interpreting the inadmissibility provision at issue in 
B010, stating: 
Thus the apparent similarity between the IRPA concept of “organized 
criminality” and the Criminal Code concept of “criminal organization” 
is no coincidence. Both provisions were enacted to give effect to the 
same international regime for the suppression of transnational crimes 
such as people smuggling. Section 37(1)(b) should be interpreted 
harmoniously with the Criminal Code’s definition of “criminal 
organization” as involving a material, including financial, benefit.51 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s summation of her reasoning in B010 
focuses on strictly separating criminal reasoning from immigration 
reasoning, thus ensuring that the criminal inadmissibility provision she is 
analyzing must match the relevant crime, and not include a potential 
penumbra of related activity: 
                                                                                                                       
50  B010, supra, note 24, at para. 1. 
51  Id., at para. 46. 
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The wording of s. 37(1)(b), its statutory and international contexts, and 
external indications of the intention of Parliament all lead to the 
conclusion that this provision targets procuring illegal entry in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit in the 
context of transnational organized crime. To justify a finding of 
inadmissibility against the appellants on the grounds of people 
smuggling under s. 37(1)(b), the Ministers must establish before the 
Board that the appellants are people smugglers in this sense. The 
appellants can escape inadmissibility under s. 37(1)(b) if they merely 
aided in the illegal entry of other refugees or asylum-seekers in the 
course of their collective flight to safety.52  
It is too soon, in mid-2018, to predict whether this important turn in 
reasoning will leave a strong impression on subsequent jurisprudence, 
but the potential for a salubrious flow-on effect is clear.  
Chief Justice McLachlin penned three other immigration rulings. 
The 2014 decision in Harkat considered whether the government’s 
responses to the earlier Charkaoui No. 1 ruling met the standards set by 
the Court on that occasion.53 Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for the 
approving majority in this case, building on from her work on Charkaoui 
(No. 1). In the second case handed down in 2014, the Chief Justice 
penned another set of majority reasons in Febles.54 Here the issue before 
the Court was how to interpret the Refugee Convention provision 
excluding individuals convicted of serious non-political crimes from 
refugee protection. In this case there was an opportunity to break new 
ground, but the majority of the Court was content to make small 
clarifications and generally affirm the direction of lower courts.  
The remaining immigration judgment penned by McLachlin C.J.C. 
was chronologically her first, and her only dissent.55 In the 2002 
Lavoie ruling, McLachlin C.J.C. wrote that provisions of the Public 
Service Employment Act56 establishing preferences for Canadian 
citizens constituted discrimination on the basis of citizenship and were 
indistinguishable from the issue in the seminal Andrews v. Law Society  
 
                                                                                                                       
52  Id., at para. 72. 
53  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, [2014] S.C.J. No. 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harkat”]. 
54  Supra, note 24.  
55  Lavoie, supra, note 24. 
56  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33. 
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of British Columbia ruling.57 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concurred. The 
plurality of their colleagues found either that there was no equality 
rights infringement (Arbour and LeBel JJ.) or that the infringement 
was a reasonable limitation (Bastarache, Gonthier, Iacobucci, and 
Major JJ.). The Chief Justice’s dissent is characteristically strong  
and clear:  
The very act of forcing some people to make such a choice 
[changing their citizenship] violates human dignity, and is therefore 
inherently discriminatory. The law of discrimination thus far has not 
required applicants to demonstrate that they could not have avoided 
the discriminatory effect in order to establish a denial of equality 
under s. 15(1).58  
Chief Justice McLachlin’s track record as a dissentient is important, 
but not central to her legacy.59 It seems she dissented when she found it 
necessary to do so, but preferred to persuade others to her view whenever 
possible. Her reasons in Lavoie reflect this disposition: she dissents in 
clear strong terms, on matters of deep principle. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s work in the area of immigration law is 
emblematic of her leadership style. When something needed doing, 
she stepped up. She led the Court by sheer hard work and clearheaded 
reasoning. During her term as Chief Justice she took on a 
disproportionate workload in the immigration law area, despite a 
much smaller role in this area prior to becoming Chief. Why would 
she have made this choice? It is impossible for me to know for 
certain. But it is undeniably the case that during her time at the helm 
of the Court, immigration matters were increasingly hotly contested, 
legally and politically, across all Western liberal states. She led in a  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
57  [1999] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). This case was the Supreme 
Court’s first Charter equality rights decision. The Court held that a rule limiting admission to 
the legal profession to Canadian citizens and excluding permanent residents was a breach of 
the Charter. 
58  Lavoie, supra, note 24, at para. 5. 
59  See Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, “Judging Gender: Difference and Dissent 
at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 15:1-2 Intl. J. Leg. Prof. 57. 
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time when xenophobia was ascendant and intermingled deeply with 
terrorism fears that go to the heart of our society and our democracy. 
This meant that the immigration matters that came before her Court, 
despite the enormous restrictions that made them few in number, all 
go in some way to the heart of our identity as a nation and our core 
understandings of liberty, equality, and justice. In this setting, 
leadership matters immensely. Chief Justice McLachlin responded 
accordingly.  
 
